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Abstract: In the aftermath of the UK referendum on 23 June, 2016 that resulted in a sonorous negative 
decision regarding the willingness of the British people to remain in the EU, a significant number of 
alarming questions have emerged. Although Europe should have forged in crises, nowadays, many 
compromises have to be made in order to maintain the European construction as intact as possible. The 
question we attempt to answer is whether a new phase of unconventional monetary policy in the form 
of QE would be appropriate to lessen the threat of an upcoming crisis. This is why we examine 
Eurozone QE perspectives through the prism of the new without the UK era of the EU in order to 
highlight the pros and cons of the historical Brexit decision. As new rounds of unconventional 
monetary policy are believed to be essential for supporting the weaker countries in the European south, 
perspectives of non-conventional success could alter and optimal policies be substantially reformulated 
subject to the newly-arising constraints.  
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1. Introduction 
 
There is a growing tendency among economic agents that harsh economic shocks, 
such as the result of the recent referendum in the UK that is taking Britain out of the 
European Union (EU), render unconventional monetary policies more indispensable 
than before. This holds because of the UK being large and important enough to create 
an upheaval on a European, or even a global scale, due to its systemic importance in 
the financial and economic sectors.  
Brexit was a real shock to many scholars, economists and political thinkers. Many 
of them thought that it might be only the tip of the iceberg: once the door opened it 
might lead to many EU countries to follow the British path for a variety of socio-
economic reasons (Grexit - Greece, Nexit - Netherlands etc.).  
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However, some others believe that Brexit may give to the EU the opportunity to 
increase its coherence since the UK was always between the European and Anglo-
Saxon road and they argued that sometime in the future, which is now, the British 
would finally decide to choose sides. If this belief is true, it may mean that Brexit was 
a phenomenon that took place for a specific set of historical and socio-economic 
reasons. Once Brexit happened many Euroscepticists demanded referendums to be 
held in their countries for the same reasons.1 Would the same happen in France and 
the Netherlands, two historically strong “pillars” of European unification? 
Furthermore, southern EU countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Cyprus) as well as other 
members, are facing much discomfort by the European Union’s economic policies.  
This paper is an attempt to answer whether a new phase of unconventional 
monetary policy in the form of QE would be appropriate to lessen the threat of an 
upcoming crisis. The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 concerns how the 
monetary policy of the UK and the EU could alter due to Brexit. In Section 3, a 
detailed description of QE-related perspectives in the UK as well as in the Eurozone 
under the new Brexit-led constraints is given, in order for a clearer picture of the most 
or less probable scenarios in the near or more distant future to be presented.  Section 4 
analyses furtherly the issue of the UK connection to the EU and QE perspectives. 
Finally, conclusions about the post-Brexit newly-arising era are made in Section 5.  
 
2. Will Brexit alter the character of UK and the EU strategies concerning 
monetary issues? 
 
Just after the result of the referendum was publicized, the Bank of England 
announced that it had an excessive contingency plan and was working closely with 
HM Treasury. The expensive imports from now on will impose inflationary pressures 
that might work as an impediment to the abrupt downfall of the sterling exchange 
rate. The sterling devaluation as a consequence of Brexit has nothing to do with a 
                                                          
1 http://metro.co.uk/2016/06/24/could-nexit-follow-brexit-dutch-mp-calls-for-referendum-5964035/ 
http://www.nltimes.nl/2016/06/24/wake-brexit-vote-wilders-calls-dutch-nexit/ 
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reduced intrinsic value in the current fiat money environment, but with a lower 
credibility on the part of British authorities.   
This is derived from the surge in unreliability of the latter, as exiting the EU forms 
a major step back, and this decision has induced a great level of extra volatility in the 
UK financial market. As an immediate consequence of leaving the EU, the euro will 
become a safer asset whereas the sterling will become undervalued. Convincingly 
enough, this will lead the UK to a long-lasting competitive advantage, whereas the 
already afflicted by the euro-crisis European market will suffocate by a lack of 
competitiveness due to the high prices that British importers will have to pay for 
European products in terms of sterling. Moreover, levels of credibility in the EU will 
be downgraded, as Brexit will increase the probability assigned to other members also 
leaving. This will inevitably boost the country-risk in each of the EU members and in 
the EU as a whole, raising risk premiums. Apart from the lack of cooperation between 
governments and central banks, growing Brexit-induced pessimism is reinforced and 
to blame for the risk of economic languishment. 
It is noteworthy that economic growth was expected to be zero in the UK for a 
number of quarters. Economy expanded at about 0.5% in the three months after the 
Brexit vote.2 The UK current account deficit equals 7% and a sterling devaluation 
could highly likely prove beneficial for its curtailing. A steep decline in the value of 
the sterling though, may induce businesses to take advantage of possible extensive 
arbitrage revenues and prefer to keep these profits in their pockets. Differently 
expressed, profit made due to the Brexit-caused exchange rate movements has a high 
probability of not being reinvested on a low price - high quality policy. This will 
therefore shrink economic growth. In such an economic recrudescence, the Bank of 
England would be forced to acquire an intensified quasi-fiscal role by injecting 
liquidity into the UK markets, probably in the form of a new QE-type round. 
                                                          
2 According to Bloomberg, the UK economy slowed less than economists forecast in the quarter after 
the Brexit vote because of a surge in services, providing ammunition for critics of those who warned of 
a possible fallout before the referendum. See https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-27/u-
k-economy-proves-resilient-to-brexit-with-hollywood-s-help and 
https://www.ft.com/content/bab284e4-9c1d-11e6-a6e4-8b8e77dd083a 
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Europe’s financial capital the day after Brexit, provoked an immense fall in British 
banks’ share prices, especially in large systemic banks such as Lloyd’s and Barclays. 
All this happened in conditions of fear about an imminent credit degradation of the 
UK by the S&P rating agency. Endeavoring a smoother transition to the post-Brexit 
era, the terms of the UK’s leaving the EU should be negotiated in such a way that the 
benefits from HSBC, Goldman Sacks and JP Morgan building new headquarters in 
London, would not be wasted for the EU or for the UK.  
This is why a term used alongside with Brexit has been “Lexit’’, meaning that the 
UK leaving the UK would also mean the City of London financial center losing a 
large part of its status and its leading role in global markets.3 Although a significant 
reduction of London’s influence on the markets of Germany, France, Ireland or 
Luxembourg now seems inevitable, the exit should be adjusted by legislation in order 
for Brexit not to prove catastrophic for either parties. The overall downturn in 
financial markets that made its appearance approximately eight years ago should by 
no means be repeated. 
It is fairly possible though, that Brexit will have consequences beyond the 
boundaries of the UK. Apparently, an overvaluation of the yen in relation to the 
sterling will damage the Japanese economy that is already suffering from high 
deflationary levels and a very high public debt. On the day following the referendum 
in the UK, the German 10-year government bond yields fell to a record low of minus 
10 basis points due to the immediately activated “flight-to-safety’’ sentiment of 
investors.  
On the other hand, the risk of indebted countries (such as Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Greece) exiting the European Monetary Union has brought to the surface upward 
movements of their bond yields, making these regions to be considered even riskier. 
There is admittedly an easily perceivable risk that higher bond yields discounting 
                                                          
3 Some economists think that the City of London’s high turnover financial enterprises in banking, 
insurance and asset management will be harmed by Brexit. It is possible that a critical amount of such 
companies may be transferred to cities such as Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, Dublin and certainly to 
Frankfurt, which has the special privilege of having the headquarters of the ECB.  
See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/f44e8a6e-2f2a-11e6-bf8d-26294ad519fc.html 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/paris-frankfurt-amsterdam-dublin-brussels-new-
london-brexit-eu-referendum-global-financial-centre-a7113266.html 
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equity holdings will reduce the assets’ value, while will increase their liabilities’ 
value. In other words, net values will fall and solvency problems will emerge. A 
significant example is the UK corporate pension deficit that has widened by £80 
million overnight (that is 10 times the annual EU budget contribution). 
 
3. Perspectives and consequences after the Brexit 
 
3.1. UK perspectives after leaving the EU 
In 2010-2014, the UK had total exports amounting to the 2.9% of the UK’s GDP4 
whereas its imports constituted only the 2.4% of the GDP. The main sectors of 
exchanges were vehicles, machines and chemicals and formed about three quarters of 
the total transactions. 
During the last 15 years, more than 20% of the inward European foreign direct 
investments have been given to the UK, even though these had no full access to the 
EU’s internal markets. Their main destination was the UK car industry. After the 
Brexit decision, it is reasonable that this money could effectively be used to help other 
European countries, thus depriving British of a significant assistance. On the other 
hand, the UK will benefit by the fact that after Brexit British taxpayers will be not 
burdened anymore by contributions to the EU overall budget. The UK spent 15 billion 
euros in 2015 out of a total of €142.1 EU-28 billion euros.5 
A scenario strongly promoted by supporters of Brexit is that if the UK were able to 
abolish all import tariffs after leaving the EU, this could obstruct a significant rise in 
GDP, perhaps large enough to offset the consequences of a devaluation of sterling. 
This would be difficult to realize, though.  
                                                          
4 http://voxeu.org/article/implications-brexit-rest-eu 
5 However, it must be acknowledged that since 1984 the UK has been receiving a refund on a part of its 
contribution to the EU budget, the so-called rebate. 
See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8036802.stm 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/483344/EU_finances_20
15_final_web_09122015.pdf 
After Brexit the 27 EU member’s states must provide a larger amount of money to cover the EU 
budget. Obviously, this will be achieved through further taxation in each member-state. 
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Moreover, if the depreciation proved to be large enough, tariff reduction would end 
up having no significant impact overall. This way, consumption and wealth effects 
emerging by larger and cheaper imports would be counterbalanced by lower income 
due to a weaker pound. This could turn the other way round if and only if the higher 
volume of exports was large enough. In addition, Britain’s exports to the EU and to 
other members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) would have to suffer tariffs 
and be subject to regulation of the WTO. The latter has not managed to liberalize 
markets as much as the EU, so EU markets would have less access to UK producers.6  
Unconventional monetary policy is again of the most highly estimated candidate to 
remedy this extensively debatable situation. Quantitative Easing (QE) could provide 
an additional stimulus in order for the UK to attain economic sanity under the new 
spectrum of challenges. The further impetus that the UK economy will require may 
result in lower levels of interest rates, even flirting with a negative sign. This would 
inevitably pose a threat on building societies that heavily rely on funding by deposits 
and mainly make mortgage lending. This is why a new round of liquidity-injecting 
expansionary monetary policy in the form of QE has a high probability to emerge as a 
solution. The lack of confidence engendered by the Brexit announcement may even 
call for irredeemable money injections in the form of helicopter money drops.  
Estimations about the new round of QE needs are about £100-150 billion7, a little 
less than half of the aggregate liquidity injections of £375 billion during the past three 
QE rounds. A probable stimulatory scenario would be expanding the Funding 
Lending Scheme (FLS), which the Treasury and the BOE initiated in 2012, in order to 
provide growth-generating liquidity to British banks. Hopefully, this new money 
would be diffused to reliable enterprises in the form of low-risk credit. It should be 
noted that leaving the EU renders assets illiquid and urges British investors (including 
banks) to take on riskier investments in order to achieve higher profits.  
The undesired corollary of this is greater instability in the UK financial system. 
This would form a good reason for the British government to guarantee bank deposits, 
under the conditions that moral hazard problems could be limited. 
                                                          
6 http://www.voxeu.org/article/life-after-brexit-uk-s-options-outside-eu 
7 http://www.economist.com/news/britain/21701260-britain-faces-months-economic-uncertainty-
implications-brexit-bank-england 
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3.2. European perspectives after Brexit and the ghost of a further Euroexit 
As regards the effects of Brexit on the EU and the EMU, a scenario of an additional 
level of unconventional monetary practices should be taken into consideration. 
Nevertheless, it should not be neglected that the UK leaving the EU could affect the 
embryonic stage of QE where the EU lies in, via most of its channels.  
Large-scale asset purchases could be perceived as a sign of a desperate attempt to 
maintain sanity in the European financial system, after the EU having lost one of its 
most prominent members. Moreover, due to Brexit, economic agents would tend to 
prefer holding safer assets (flight-to-safety) in their portfolios, thereby reducing the 
efficacy of the portfolio rebalancing effect that is favorable for liquidity. Apart from 
that, confidence would be very low as regards the European perspectives.  
The yield curve would not flatten as it should, and asset prices would fall, 
lessening the so-confoundedly desired QE wealth effect strength. Additionally, 
conventional forward guidance policy would become highly unreliable due to the 
aggravation of time-inconsistency problems in tandem with a higher probability of 
adverse exit shocks showing up. Unavoidably, the potential of further exits from the 
EU or the Eurozone would make the EMU step more intensely and hazardous into 
uncharted territory. 
Interestingly enough, there is some share of thinking, though not a voluminous 
one, supporting that Brexit could prove stimulatory for the bank-centric Eurozone 
(EZ) countries, due to the competitive advantage that would bring for the UK. On the 
other hand, exports to the UK will be very difficult to be conducted. It also has to be 
taken into consideration that the great decrease in the EZ credibility due to Brexit may 
provoke a need for even more restrictive monetary policies by the ECB and even 
stricter fiscal policies imposed to European national governments.  
This would render sovereign debts even harder to handle and would probably 
increase incentives to leave the EZ. Due to the non-linearity (domino effect) of 
motivations to leave a union or abandon a policy rule during a crisis and also due to 
credibility losses, it is quite possible that a new financial crisis could show up. 
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Consequently, unconventional monetary policies would then become indispensable to 
a larger degree, even though their efficacy would be lower than before as this would 
not be the first round of QE.  
The EU should not apply its external customs duties on UK goods and services, or 
erect regulations and licences as impediments in free-trading with the UK. The 
possibility of imposing material restrictions on the UK’s ability to conduct 
transactions in euros, as well as in euro-derivatives would be extremely harmful. 
Greater transaction costs between the UK and the EU would bring again a form of 
returning to barter-like exchanges, reducing the elasticity between trades.      
There is a growing fear that Brexit is likely to intensify inequalities between EU 
members. This would be translated into the remaining members getting a larger share 
of the European economic activity and a higher burden concerning the participation of 
each member’s participation and contribution in the overall EU’s budget, although the 
smaller of them could be harmed. Bearing in mind that the UK is a net contributor, 
total income in the EU will fall, and a smaller part of that will be given to poorer 
countries of the EU. The oligopolistic powers of the powerful European members are 
likely to be fortified, also strengthening the credibility of the ECB.  
On the other hand, southern countries will become even more vulnerable to 
imposition of the powerful countries’ decisions. This has to do with the possibility 
that the economically strong member-states such as Germany (which after Brexit, will 
strengthen its main position as the main economic steam-engine of the EU) may be 
less willing to negotiate concerning the alleviation of austerity measures as far as the 
weak economy EU member states such as Greece are concerned. Why? Because, 
according to some thinkers, after Brexit, any more reluctance and “tolerance” by the 
strong EU members, which so far have heavily subsidized (through their own 
taxpayers) the financial mechanisms of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and 
the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) may be regarded as a sign of 
weakness. 
So far, concerning the EMU and ECB realities, “chicken game” strategies have 
proven ineffective when trying to be implemented by the economically weak to the 
strong member states. The recent July 2015 failed Greek government’s plans to make 
the EU institutions and the IMF accept its own terms during negotiations with the EU 
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Commission, the EMU and the IMF before the establishment of the 3rd Greek MoU of 
July 2015, (which was finally accompanied by an 86 billion bailout package under the 
aegis of the EU institutions and the IMF) is proof of such a view.8 
But there is also another extreme possibility: in order to show a sign of strength, 
unity and no affection by Brexit, the rest of the economically strong EU members 
states (Germany, France, etc.) may “overdo” it in the sense of demanding more and 
more austerity measures to be undertaken by the governments of the economically 
weak member-states, as an exchange for agreeing to contribute to any kind of future 
bailout packages under the aegis of the ECB. This may seem to be a “carrot and stick 
strategy”: any more lending may materialize providing that weak states accept harsher 
austerity measures (which are, of course, part of further strict neo-liberal economic 
doctrines, if seen from a wider economic policy perspective). 
What such a policy may not seriously takes into account, is that it carries the risk 
of further possible Euroexit scenarios, as a self-fulfilling prophecy: the economically 
strong EU members may think that since there is a possibility of exit on the part of 
many EU economically weak countries, the later must be threatened by further 
economic measures9, and then succumb to their fears, in order to adopt more 
“realistic” (austerity) economic policy strategies on the national level. But such a 
strategy, if it can be imposed by the strong members on the weak ones, does not 
seriously take into account the fact that austerity measures cannot be acceptable 
forever by people in the EZ member-states and particularly by the citizens in 
countries with already harmed economies such as Greece, Cyprus, Italy, Spain, 
Portugal etc., the southern EU member-states. The politico-economic “prestige” of the 
EU in these countries may further erode in a critical level, which might finally lead to 
a new exit case such as Brexit.  
Thus, we argue that if EMU austerity policies are finally strengthened in the short, 
or even long term, then European countries with high sovereign debts (such as those 
mentioned above) would become even more motivated to leave the Eurozone or even 
the EU. This is why a new financial “remedy” might be a tangible solution: a round of 
                                                          
8 On this issue concerning the Greek case see http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0b340146-b20e-11e4-b380-
00144feab7de.html and Kyriazis and Economou (2016). 
9 However, we avoid calling them “sanctions”. 
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QE has to be implemented by the ECB. Although the UK was not part of the 
Eurozone, its being a member-state of the EU was undoubtedly a major influence on 
power-sharing inside and on the credibility of the euro-area. Major economists such 
as M. Friedman (2005) have supported monetary expansions such as helicopter 
money drops and considered them as highly effective. 
As it has already been mentioned above, until now, the Eurozone has created the 
European Stability Mechanism and has introduced the Outright Monetary Transaction 
Scheme (OMT) in order to handle the financial crisis. Additionally, it has imposed 
stricter surveillance legislation in order for a banking union to become feasible. This 
framework has to be further strengthened in the wake of an EU not having the UK as 
its member.10  
A good point about the Eurozone is that the extensive regulation has left little 
space for national governments to influence European decision-making and to 
threaten the monetary and fiscal cohesion inside the EU. Unfortunately, the 
Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedures (MIP) have not been very effective in 
confronting the Current Account Imbalances. Neither was the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism reform effective for banks. Moreover, the Stability and Growth Pact and 
the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU (also called the 
Fiscal Stability Theory) that followed, has resulted in an even more complex 
framework and failed to provide a set of transparent and applicable rules. This lack of 
credibility in the EMU, combined with Brexit, raises concerns about one or more 
indebted countries leaving the EMU. 
Bearing in mind the greater propensity to exit that EMU-members present because 
of the increasing burden of fiscal, economic and financial constraints, immediate fire-
fighting measures should be taken. Another exit from the EU would be a major shock 
                                                          
10 The European banking union is an important step towards a genuine Economic and Monetary Union 
because it will allow for the consistent application of EU banking rules in the participating countries. 
The new decision-making procedures and tools help to create a more transparent, unified and safer 
market for banks. See 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/about/bankingunion/html/index.en.html 
The procedure towards a banking union has already started. However, there is still in the open the issue 
of offering guarantee to all banks throughout the EU, meaning that if a bank in a member-state faces 
problems, the deposits of its depositor are still not guaranteed by a pan-European Banking authority. 
 11 
 
to the world’s trade and credit, because the trust in the EU could never be betrayed 
without profound moral and economic reactions. The UK, having made the first step 
towards instability of the EU, a possible not easing of austerity would lead the 
Eurozone members out of the Eurozone, by a much greater probability. Brexit will 
likely cause “beggar-thy-neighbour” phenomena due to the devalued sterling, as the 
UK trading partners will lose if devaluations are seen as a zero-sum game, which is 
often the rule. The same thing would go if another member left the EU or the 
Eurozone.  
 
3.3 Is there a remedy? Towards a more flexible ECB monetary policy? 
Not surprisingly, there could be a clear way for a policy of “cheap money” to become 
a remedy under these adverse conditions. Brexit has fortified the increasing consensus 
that debt forgiveness is more necessary than ever, no matter if this would be proper 
through a moral lens.11 The acrimonious debate about the restructuring of southern 
European countries’ sovereign debts should be done with respect to the dual mandate 
of the EMU about low inflation and non-mutualization of government debts.  
A compromising solution leading to looser fiscal restrictions imposed by the EU, 
combined with an easier EMU monetary policy, could lead to a wealth increase even 
for indebted countries (Del Negro and Sims, 2015) and help to render tighter the EU 
tissue again. On the contrary, low growth remaining in this particular moment of time 
could increase economic inequalities and austerity and thus, strengthen 
Euroscepticism and eventually it will possibly lead to the fragmentation of the EMU 
and the EU. 
The trilemma of Pisany-Ferry (see Pisany-Ferry, 2012) makes its appearance once 
again, highlighting the great difficulty in attaining at the same time a European fiscal 
union, a European banking union12, and the ECB acting as the lender of last resort for 
                                                          
11 For example, Peter Bofinger (University of Wuerzburg), economic adviser to the German 
government is in favour of an extra debt relief in favour of the Greek economy. See 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/b/f42f9b6d-ef1c-41b0-bd66-0457e639055b 
12 For the creation of a Fiscal Union in the EU see, among others, Bordo, Markiewicz and Jonung 
(2011) and Fuest and Peichl (2012). For a European Banking Union see, among others, de Quiros 
(1999), Beck (2012), Goyal et al. (2013) and Schoenmaker (2015). 
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sovereigns. A government debt restructuring would have devastating consequences 
for the banking system, because of banks’ great exposure to their countries’ sovereign 
debt. Public money should not be the first, not even the last means of supporting the 
banking system. Sharing of risks should be realized in early stages and in proportion 
to each country’s share in the ECB’s capital, in order for the risk-sharing to become as 
less unfair as possible, and decision-making as regards debt-mutualization to be 
characterized by the highest possible degree of unanimity. 
 
4. UK connection to the EU and QE perspectives 
It has to be taken into consideration that, since the onset of the financial crisis, the UK 
has created the Financial Policy Committee and the Prudential Regulation Authority 
of the Bank of England and the Financial Conduct Authority. The BOE is responsible 
for ensuring financial stability in the UK and is accountable to the Parliament.  
The UK leaving the EU will reduce financial openness and shrink the UK financial 
system, but will leave it with a lower level of complexity and less vulnerable to 
external shocks. Legislation and regulatory matters will increasingly become a British 
responsibility, thereby reducing the credibility the UK financial system had as an EU-
standardized safe system. Special attention should be attributed to the great extent of 
interdependency between the UK and the EU, as half of the former’s trades (worth 
approximately 30% of the UK’s GDP) are conducted with the latter. Two-thirds of 
European imports of the UK, are from Germany and it is noteworthy that the spreads 
margin reflecting the safety ratings difference between the two countries will be 
considerably increased. 
Regarding labor dynamics, the stricter legislation will also be an impediment for 
the growth of the British economy. It should be kept in mind that about 1.3 million 
British people live and work in the EU, whereas 3 million European people live and 
work in the UK. It is reasonably expected that labor rigidities will provoke 
dysfunctions in the goods, services, capital and labor markets, by reducing the UK’s 
economy and its market size, and lowering competition.  
The matching of capital and labor will become costly in the UK and British 
enterprises will conform to a poorer level of specialization and shrinkage in the 
Research and Development sectors. Migration flows will be restricted due to the loss 
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of EU citizenship in the UK, so capital mobility will lose its primary lubricant. 
Microprudential and macroprudential policy set by the Bank of England will be less 
influenced by EU laws13, thus bringing lower credibility in the financial system, 
despite EU regulations not being considered as strict ones. It is remarkable that since 
the subprime crisis occurred, the UK credit default swap premia (which constitute a 
measure for the bank credit risk) with comparison to the EU ones, have risen 
significantly and not fallen thereafter. This suggests a high level of interconnection 
between the two areas. Moreover, a non-negligible part of the UK’s relationship with 
the EU’s risk is expected to remain intact because the adoption of the OECD’s Code 
of Liberalization of Capital Movements does not leave wide possibilities of policy 
differentiation between members and non-members of the EU. 
      Thus, a new and more substantial round of QE in the Eurozone could probably 
urge investors to increase their demand for substitutes such as UK and US 
government bonds, thereby increasing UK’s bond prices and lowering their yields. 
This would stimulate inflationary pressures inside the United Kingdom. On the other 
hand, Brexit could accelerate the UK transition towards a new phase of the QE, in 
order to boost the British aggregate demand. Utilization of the Funding for Lending 
Scheme (FLS) could be used once more in order to reduce funding costs in the UK, 
with the cost of inflationary pressures showing up. QE actions adopted by the Bank of 
England could bring beneficial effects not only for the UK but also for the EU 
because fewer shocks from the former could hit the latter. The same can be said for 
the other way round.  
Further unconventional monetary measures, such as helicopter money drops14 in 
the UK should be extensively examined regarding their efficiency. Although 
permanent money injected into the UK economy would stimulate a more effective 
economic spur, the credibility of the UK’s authorities would be seriously afflicted, 
despite being already hurt due to Brexit. No matter what, the amplitude of credibility 
                                                          
13 http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Documents/speeches/2015/euboe211015.pdf 
14 Helicopter money is referred to a policy where a government prints money to try to spur growth and 
get inflation higher. It is an idea based on a metaphor used by the renowned economist Milton 
Friedman nearly five decades ago and given new life in this century by Ben Bernanke, ex-Fed 
Chairman. 
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loss should not surpass a critical level where the foreigners’ mistrust regarding the 
UK would become irreversible.  
In other words, helicopter money drops should not be preferred, or at least should 
not be realized in a great extent.  On the other hand, unconventional monetary policy 
in the form of long-term asset purchases could indeed be effective. This is because it 
could be seen as a brand new expansionary policy episode in the freshly-started post-
Brexit era. This way it would not be subject to the more or less formed expectations’ 
constraints. Differently said, the new shock that Brexit provides could alter investors’ 
beliefs about the UK economic policy, so that the restructuring of the UK financial 
sector could provide with increasing efficiency levels the new round of 
unconventional policy. 
As regards the EU, perspectives for a larger risk-sharing of national sovereign 
debts could become more and more welcome under conditions of the larger risk of an 
EU crack that Brexit has imposed. The so-desired achievement of a European banking 
union and a capital markets union in the EU could become more easily reached after 
Brexit, as the UK was never affirmatively positive about its willingness to be totally 
integrated in the European construction. Most probably, in the short-run, volatility 
will have high levels previously considered as outliers to become a regularity, both for 
the UK and the EU.  
In the medium-term however, when the EU becomes more focused outside the UK 
as the EU financial center, it can render stronger and more unified than before. It can 
barely be doubted that one of the prerequisites of the longer-term viability in the EU 
is its cohesion. Quantitative easing measures could look as one of the appropriate 
solutions to healthfully strengthen the bank-centric character of the EU in order for 
better days to come. The powerful members of the EU and the Eurozone would 
probably again be opposed to a substantial level of money injection in fear of further 
moral hazard motivation evoking. Even though they should not forget that the word 
“pay” has its origins in the verb “to pacify”.  
But “pay” in the sense of creating money through QE or helicopter QE 
mechanisms may also be the remedy for creating jobs, if exercised prudently and not 
excessively by the monetary policymakers in the EU-27 and the UK, may increase 
people’s wealth and the overall consumption, especially in those economies being 
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under economic recession such as Greece, thus creating the opportunities for a 
gradual economic recovery and growth (while facing also deflation and austerity 
policies which harm the social cohesion throughout the EU). 
Admittedly, there is enough room to support that the pacification between parts of 
the same body that QE policies can provide could be a way to come up against the 
double hurdles that the debt crisis and Brexit have engendered. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The shock from the decision of the British people to leave the EU was most likely not 
anticipated. It was a crucial historical benchmark which may critically undermine the 
planned EU integration since the UK still plays a major role in global economic and 
geopolitical affairs. 
Views in favor of Euroscepticism, have emerged recently very rapidly with strong 
momentum, mainly due to austerity policies (being implemented by most of the EU-
27 and the UK government policymakers) that have undermined socioeconomic 
cohesion in these countries. We argued that this situation is strongly related to the 
mixture of monetary policies that are exercised by the ECB, the Bank of England and 
the rest of the EU-member states banks. We have also argued that due to this 
situation, QE policies could possibly find a way to usefully re-emerge as an arrow in 
the quiver of monetary authorities in order to stimulate economic recovery, both in the 
UK and the EU. The strong connections of the latter to the former may become looser 
than in the pre-Brexit era, though a significant degree of interdependence will 
continue to exist.  
Liquidity injecting without causing serious harmful effects on the credibility of the 
monetary authorities in their areas, would constitute the ideal solution. Arguably 
enough, this could only be offered by unconventional monetary policies, such as 
large-scale asset purchases of a non-permanent character so as to restrain moral 
hazard incentives. 
This paper makes looks at current circumstances through the lens of the UK’s 
relationship with the EU. According to our view, risk-sharing of European sovereign 
debts is likely to induce the desired pacification and cohesion in the EU and the EMU, 
whereas it should be noted that the UK is in need of urgent stimulatory liquidity-
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providing actions due to Brexit.  We hope that this analysis and our suggestions may 
open a vast future area of research and discussion that our paper will help to promote. 
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